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Abstract 
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of collective-choice proce­
dures treats only of r esolute procedures. Few real or reasonable procedures are resolute. 
We prove a generalization of Gibbard-Satterthwaite that covers the nonresolute case. It 
opens harder questions than it answers about the prediction of behavior and outcomes 
and the design of institutions. 
STRATEGIC MANIPULABILITY IS 
INESCA PAB LE: GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE 
WITHOUT RESO LUTENESS* 
John Duggan Thomas Schwartz 
A voting rule, market economy, management hierarchy, or other co llecti ve choice
procedure turns the professed preferences of several individuals into one collective choice 
- one chosen alternative or one choice set of two or more "tied" alternatives. It is strategy
free or nonmanipulable if it ensures that no one acting alone can ever gain a preferred 
outcome by misrepresenting his preferences - voting for a second-best candidate, for 
example, to stop a worse one from winning, or introducing a disliked amendment to 
kill a disliked bill, or dumping many shares of a prized stock to depress its price. The 
celebrated theorem of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) is often said to show 
that any strategy-free procedure for choosing among three or more alternatives must be 
dictatorial. In one way the theorem is stronger than this summary: it shows that a 
nondictatorial procedure must be manipulable, not only for some set of three or more 
feasible alternatives, but for any given set. In another way the theorem is weaker: it 
is not about all collective-choice procedures but only r eso lute ones. They choose single 
alternatives in every possible circumstance, never allowing ties. 
Most collective-choice procedures of any importance are nonresolute, we argue (§1), 
and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem does not show that they are manipulable except 
in special circumstances. Some published manipulability theorems do not assume reso­
luteness, but in other ways their generality is limited. We contrast these theorems with a 
new one (§2), a generalization of Gibbard-Satterthwaite that covers the nonresolute case 
while avoiding the limitations of earlier results. Before stating (§4) and proving (§5) this 
theorem, we explain.it in .deta.iLhut .informally .. (.§3) . . Jt . .  o.pens harder _questions than it 
answers about the incidence of strategic behavior, the existence and predictive value of 
equilibria, and the design of institutions (§6). 
*We thank Peter Ordeshook, Thomas Palfrey, Charles Plott, and Martin van Hees for helpful discus­
sions. Schwartz thanks the UCLA Senate for research support. 
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1 Nonresolute Procedures and the Gibbard­
Satterthwaite Theorem 
Outside the two-alternative case, few collective-choice procedures found in practice 
or in the imaginations of theorists and reformers are resolute: most allow ties, or multi­
member choice sets. Ties are allowed by all familiar election rules (Plurality, Runoff, 
Borda, List PR, STY, SNTV, etc.), welfare criteria (maximum average welfare, max­
imin, and whatnot), and preference-sensitive taxation schemes (Lindahl, Clarke, Groves­
Ledyard). Market economies and other exchange mechanisms also allow ties (multiple 
competitive equilibria, multi-member contract sets and cores). So must any procedure 
that fulfills the democratic ideals of anonymity (individuals count equally) and neutrality 
(alternatives count equally). 
Parliamentary procedure is an apparent exception. It turns any multi-alternative 
contest into a series of yes-or-no votes. At each vote, the no option wins by default if the 
yes option lacks the required majority. That ensures a unique final winner. But to see 
this procedure as resolute is to see the agenda on any occasion - the series of yes-or-no 
votes - as part the procedure, making "the procedure" a host of ad hoc procedures that 
differ between any two occasions of choice. If "the procedure" is seen instead as one 
that endures from occasion to occasion of choice, then the choice set on any occasion 
comprises every alternative choosable under some agenda then permissible, each in effect 
a tie-breaker. Seen that way, parliamentary procedure is especially irresolute - it often 
yields large choice sets - even when the alternatives to appear on the agenda are specified 
in advance (Ordeshook and Schwartz 1987). 
Which is the right way to see parliamentary procedure? Neither is uniquely right. 
We climb a ladder of resolution when we start with general parliamentary procedure 
and add reporting committees, scheduling and recognition rules, and finally a specific 
agenda: each addition yields a more resolute procedure, one that narrows the choice sets 
of its predecessor. We do the same when we start with the constitutional requirements 
for some elective office and add statutes governing the details of balloting, nominations, 
constituency divisions, and the like. And we do the same when we start with a whole 
constitution a.nd-·add ·legislative ·rules,·ministries;--standing·progra.ms, and so forth, or 
when we start with a code of property law and add contracts, courts, and money, or 
again when we start with a corporate charter and add a table of organization, hiring 
policies, and whatnot. Climb to the top of any ladder of resolution and you will see 
either a resolute procedure or one that resolves some residual ties by chance or historical 
accident. But you a.re free to stop before the top and see the part climbed as a collective­
choice procedure and the pa.rt above as a tie-resolving mechanism for that procedure. 
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The question of manipulability can be posed at any rung, but often it is more interesting 
at lower rungs, where the choice sets that might be changed by manipulation are bigger, 
and changes in them more consequential. Take the February-to-December procedure 
for electing a U.S. president: state primaries (rung 1), national conventions (rung 2), 
general election (rung 3), formal vote of the Electoral College (rung 4). A manipulation 
of this four-rung procedure might be more discomfiting, or anyway more surprising, than 
a manipulation of the procedure (rung 5) by which the House of Representatives resolves 
Electoral College ties. 
Gibbard emphasizes that his theorem says nothing about procedures involving chance. 
That is an understatement: the theorem It also says nothing about low-rung procedures. 
Does it imply more than it says? Yes, but not very much. 
Standard election rules are near resolute: electoral ties are rare and rarely large. 
Although resoluteness bans all possible ties, these procedures fall so little short of reso­
luteness, one might contend, that nothing much can hang on the shortfall. But see how 
much is hung on little shortfalls by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: to block all 
possible opportunities for manipulation, a nondictatorial procedure for choosing among 
three or more alternatives must deviate at least a bit from perfect resoluteness. Just a 
little bit may be enough, and the opportunities that have to be blocked may be very few, 
so far as we know from the theorem. 
When multi-member sets are chosen, it is tempting to count them as "alternatives" 
on all fours with their members (Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou 1991). But Gibbard­
Satterthwaite still does not apply because it assumes unrestricted preference orderings 
of whatever qualify as "alternatives," in this case allowing someone who prefers { x} to 
{ y} to {z} also to prefer { y, z} to {x }.
Yes, a nonresolute procedure must be combined with some tie-resolving mechanism. 
But suppose that this mechanism is stochastic or partly so: it picks lotteries, not all of 
them degenerate. Then Gibbard-Satterthwaite does not apply to the combined proce­
dure, much less the original one, unless we assume unrestricted preference orderings of 
lotteries, and that is no more reasonable than unrestricted preference orderings of sets. 
So suppose instead that the tie-resolving mechanism is completely deterministic. Let 
there be three or more feasible alternatives and no dictator. Now Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
implies that the combined procedure is manipulable. But it is the original, lower-rung 
procedure whose manipulability may be of interest. Does Gibbard-Satterthwaite imply 
that it is manipulable? Not if the tie-resolving mechanism depends on the professed pref­
erences of individuals: for all we know from the theorem, a manipulator of the combined 
procedure can change the final outcome from one to another member of the pre-resolution 
choice set but can never change that set. If, on the other hand, the tie-resolving mecha­
nism does not depend at all on professed preferences; then a manipulator of the combined 
procedure must change the pre-resolution choice set to change the final selection from 
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that set, so the original procedure is manipulable once the tie-resolving mechanism is 
in place. But that follows from Gibbard-Satterthwaite only in this rather special case: 
the tie-resolving mechanism is completely independent of professed preferences yet com­
pletely deterministic. 
2 What is Known and What is to be Shown 
Beginning in the late eighteenth century, students of voting have learned that all famil­
iar voting rules, none of them resolute, are manipulable when the feasible alternatives 
are three or more. Do we know anything more general, anything like the Gibbard­
Satterthwaite theorem shorn of its resoluteness assumption? 
This question raises another. Strategy freedom bans all possible cases of manipula­
tion. When collective choices are single alternatives and preferences are represented by 
orderings of alternatives, the banned cases are of this type: 
A change in Mr. i's professed ordering of alternatives, all else re­
maining the same, changes the collective choice from an alternative 
x to an alternative y though y is preferred to x according to i's 
original ordering. 
But when collective choices are sets of alternatives, what does it mean for one to be 
preferred to another according to an ordering of alternatives? Four approaches have 
been taken to this problem. 
Where X and Y are potential choice sets, the Heroic Approach ascribes a preference 
for Y over X to individual i only when such a preference is plainly necessitated by i's 
ordering of alternatives. For example, someone who prefers x to y to z must prefer 
{x} to { y,z} and {x,y} to {z} but not necessarily { y} to {x, z} or {x, z} to { y}. Kelly 
(1977) and Barbera (1977a,b) prove manipulability theorems based on this approach, but 
they pay for weak preferential assumptions with strong procedural ones. Barbera (1977b) 
assumes the acyclicity and Kelly the transitivity of (strict) social preference, and Barbera 
(1977a) assumes "strict monotonicity," a property exemplified by few voting rules - by 
Borda, but not, for .. example, by .Phu:ality, Runoff,.or . .parliamentary.procedure. 
The Maximin Approach assumes that i prefers Y to X only if i prefers the worst 
alternative in Y (according to his preference ordering) to the worst in X. Pattanaik 
(1978) uses this approach to prove the manipulability of a number of important types 
of procedure. But those types are quite specific, defined by strong "democratic" re­
quirements. Aiso Pattanaik shares with Keiiy a formal framework which differs from 
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Gibbard-Satterthwaite's and Barbera's in a way that weakens his results: instead of as­
suming a fixed set of feasible alternatives, he lets the feasible set vary over all or many 
subsets of some given set, leaving open the possibility that manipulability afflicts few 
feasible sets. 
The Set Preference Approach represents preferences to begin with by orderings that 
rank se ts of alternatives, though it does not count all such orderings as "admissible": an 
admissible ordering might rank {x} over {x,y} over {y}, for example, but not {x} over 
{y} over {x,y}. Schwartz (1982) uses this approach to deduce manipulability from mild 
procedural assumptions. But he makes a host of opaque assumptions about admissible 
orderings of sets, and he too lets the feasible set vary. 
Finally, the Possible Preference Approach represents preferences by orderings of al­
ternatives but assumes that strategy freedom bans all cases of the following type: 
A change in i's professed ordering, all else remaining the same, 
changes the collective choice from a set X to a set Y though a 
preference for Y over X is compatible with i's original beliefs and 
ordering - though it would be possible if not compulsory for a 
rational individual who had i's original beliefs and ordering to prefer 
Y to X. 
What makes a procedure manipulable, after all, is not that it is actually manipulated 
but that it fails to make manipulation impossible. Taking this approach, Zeckhauser 
(1973) and Gibbard (1977) hit nearer our target of Gibbard-Satterthwaite without res­
oluteness. They prove manipulability for nonresolute procedures and fixed feasible sets, 
assuming that a preference for Y over X is compatible with i's original beliefs and or­
dering if a certain lottery over Y has a greater expected utility than a certain lottery 
over X for some utility function compatible with i's ordering. But besides adding some 
hard-to-interpret procedural assumptions, Zeckhauser and Gibbard assume that lotteries 
are procedurally determined: in effect, the procedure picks both a choice set and the 
probability distribution used by all individuals to evaluate that set. That is reasonable 
in most electoral contexts, where ties are resolved randomly. It is not so reasonable in 
constitutional, parliamentary, market, management, and other low-rung contexts, where 
typical choice sets are large and individuals differ in their beliefs about the resolution of 
ties, about what happens higher on the ladder, sometimes making strategic use of those 
differences. Think of legislators who profit from knowing better than their colleagues 
what motions will be recognized in what order. Or think of voters in a U.S. presidential 
election who have different beliefs about how the House of Representatives would resolve 
an Electoral College tie. Zeckhauser and Gibbard cover top-rung procedures that use 
chance to resolve residual ties, but they descend the la.dder of resolution only in worlds 
marked by an unusual coincidence of beliefs. 
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We too take the Possible Preference Approach and prove a generalization of Gibbard­
Satterthwaite that covers the nonresolute case without assuming any common beliefs 
about the resolution of ties. On the procedural side, we follow Gibbard and Satterth­
waite by assuming a fixed set of three or more alternatives, each feasible in the "citizens' 
sovereignty" sense that there is some way to secure its choice, and a fixed population 
of individuals, none a dictator, with variable preference orderings of alternatives. On 
the preferential side, we follow Zeckhauser and Gibbard by assuming that an individ­
ual compares potential choice sets as if.comparing ·lotteries· according·,to their expected 
utilities for some utility function compatible with his ordering of alternatives. But we 
generalize their framework by letting each individual i have his own lottery over every 
potential choice set X. And we let this lottery depend, not only on i and X, but on 
i's true preference ordering and the professed preferences of others. Given these factors, 
the corresponding lottery is arb itr ary but fix ed: our theorem shows that manipulation is 
possible, not merely for some set of lotteries (or beliefs) of the fancied sort, but for any
given set. 
3 Explanation of Theorem 
Like Gibbard and Satterthwaite (G&S), we assume a fixed population of individuals, 
Messrs. 1, 2, . . .  , n, and a fixed set A of three or more feasible alternatives. Unlike G&S, 
we explicitly assume that A is finite. Actually it is enough that choice sets be finite, as 
G&S assume, but then we might as well make the simpler assumption that A is finite. 
The realism of this assumption would be hard to contest: the candidates for any office 
are finite in number, as are the policy options of any sort if each is formulable from some 
given finite stock of symbols (those on your keyboard, say) in a string no longer than 
some given physical constraint (the number of quarks in the Milky Way, say). 
We copy G&S's version of citizens' sovereignty: every member of A is the unique col­
lective choice in some possible circumstance. The weaker assumption that every member 
of A belongs to the choice set in some possible circumstance is nigh impotent: it is au­
tomatically true if there is no real choice at all in some odd circumstance, the choice set 
being A itself. Our G&S version captures the idea that every so-called feasible alternative 
really is feasible, not only in the weak sense that Messrs, 1, 2, . . .  , n can somehow permit
its choice, but also in the strong sense that they can somehow secure its choice. 
G&S's version of nondictatorship says there is no individual whose professed favorite 
alternative in every possible circumstance is the unique collective choice. For nonresolute 
procedures, that is vacuous, a consequence of nonresoluteness itself. Our version says 
there is no individual whose professed favorite in every possible circumstance belongs 
to the choice set. This is stronger than it may look. Besides dictatorships of t.he l1s11al 
sort, it bans the Collective Hamlet Rule, whose choice set in any circumstance contains 
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everyone's professed favorite. More important, both versions ban dictators of some sort 
for the given set A, yet some reasonable procedures allow dictators for certain sets, those 
representing issues that affect one individual's rights. Thus, we must think of A as not 
being such a set (if it were then strategy freedom would be assured). 
It is not always clear what to count as an expression of someone's preference, nor when 
a given expression is candid (Gibbard 1973, Pattanaik 1978). But for us as for G&S, 
it is enough that every possible expression be uniquely determined by some possible 
preference ordering of alternatives, that there exist a mapping from possible preference 
orderings to possible individual strategies. Unlike G&S, we assume that all such or­
derings are line ar: they never rank two alternatives at the same level. Like G&S, we 
assume that these orderings are otherwise unrestricted, singly and in combination. The 
"possible circumstances" of the previous two paragraphs are all the profiles, or ordered n­
tuples of linear orderings of A. While barely strengthening nondictatorship and citizens' 
sovereignty, our linear restriction greatly strengthens our conclusion. If manipulation is 
possible in the universe of linear preferences, then of course it is possible in any larger 
universe which contains that one. But its possibility in the linear universe shows that it 
is possible under those preferential voting systems that require ballots to express linear 
orderings (most do) and also those non preferential systems that require ballots to desig­
nate single "favorite" alternatives, either once or at each of several stages of voting (most 
do): only linear orderings uniquely determine such ballots. It shows as well that strate­
gic misrepresentation is not just the advantageous but arbitrary resolution of subjective 
"ties." 
Our version of strategy freedom bans all cases of the following type: 
A change in Mr. i's professed ordering of alternatives, all else re­
maining the same, changes the collective choice from a set X to 
a set Y though the lottery that i associates with Y and the orig­
inal profile has a greater expected utility than the lottery that i 
associates with X and the original profile for some utility function 
compatible with i's original ordering. 
The lottery, or probability distribution, that i associates with a set X and profile v 
summarizes his beliefs about how the tie would be resolved if the choice set were X, the 
ith ordering in v were i's true preference ordering, and the others were the professed 
orderings of the other n - 1 individuals. This lottery assigns positive probabilities only 
to members of X, of course, but maybe not to all members. It is enough that the best 
and worst members of X have positive probabilities: i is not so pessimistic or optimistic 
that he ignores these possible outcomes. 
This version of strategy freedom is quite general in that individual lotteries are min-
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imally constrained but fixed: our theorem holds for any given set of lotteries of the 
assumed sort. It is quite general as well in that it allows a potential strategist's beliefs 
about the resolution of ties to be similar or not to those of other individuals, procedu­
rally determined or not, well-informed or not, dependent or not on his own preference 
ordering, and sensitive or not to the professed preferences of others (he cannot directly 
observe their tr ue preferences), hence based or not on his assessment of the behavior of 
others in the tie-resolving process. Naturally there are limitations. Mr. i's lotteries may 
evince some risk aversion or risk acceptance: because. they depend on i's own preference 
ordering, he can assign probabilities that rapidly increase or rapidly decrease down his 
ordering. But beyond that, i's lotteries cannot depend on his utilities, or preference inten­
sities, or preferences between lotteries themselves: i cannot simultaneously pick lotteries 
and utility functions to "fit" each other, as in the classical Ramsey-Savage framework, 
and we exploit this fact to prove the first lemma of §5. 
The promised theorem says that strategy freedom is inconsistent with the assump­
tions sketched earlier in this section. In proving it, we first gain control over comparisons 
between potential choice sets by deducing, in effect, that an individual has a possible 
preference (one compatible with his preference ordering and beliefs) for one such set over 
another whenever he prefers the worst alternative in the one set to the worst in the other 
or the best in the one to the best in the other. Beyond that, our proof is somewhat like 
G&S's. Where they deduce their theorem from Arrow's (1963), we similarly exploit a 
variant of Arrow's Theorem that strengthens nondictatorship to non blocker (or nonve­
toer) and weakens transitivity of social preference-or-indifference to that of strict social 
preference. 
4 Formal Statement of Theorem 
Formally, our theorem is about a set A, positive integer n, unary function C, and ternary 
functions p1, • • •  , Pn· An alternati ve is any member of A. A utility function is any real­
valued function on A. A profile is any ordered n-tuple of linear orderings of A, each a 
binary relation on A that is asymmetric, transitive, and connected in A (borne by one 
to the other of any two members of A). Denote alternatives by x, y, etc., nonempty sets 
of them by X, Y, etc., integers 1, 2, . . .  , n by i,j, etc., utility functions by u, u', etc., and 
profiles by v = (v1, . . .  ,vn), v' = (v;, ... ,v�), etc. Profiles v and v' are i- variants if 
v; = vj for all j # i. A is to be interpreted, of course, as the set of feasible alternatives, n 
as the number of individuals, C as the function that turns every v into a choice set C(v),
and Pi as the function that turns every v, X, and x into i's assessment p;(v, X, x) of the 
probability that x would be the final choice if X were the choice set, the ith ordering in 
v were i's true preference ordering, and the others were the professed orderings of the 
other n - l indi·viduals. 
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Theorem. The following six conditions are inconsistent: 
F3A A is a finite set of three or more objects. 
CH C associates with every v a nonempty subset C(v) of A, called the 
choice s et in v.
PROB Pi associates an element Pi(v,X,x) of [O, 1] with every v, X, and x so 
that LxEAPi(v,X,x) = 1 and ]Ji(v, X, y) > 0 = p;(v, X, z) whenever y
is the v;-least member or the v;-first member of X and z t/: X.
CiSov C(v) = {x} for some v (citizens' sovereignty). 
,D No i is such that, for all v, x, if x ranks first m v; then x E C(v)
(non dictatorship). 
If v and v' are i-variants then ui(C(v')) > ui(C(v)) for no represen­
tative u of v; (strategy freedom), 
where u is a representative of v; if and only if, for all x, y, u(x) > u(y) just 
when xviy, 
and ui(X) = LxEXl'i(v,X, x)u(x) (i's expected u-value of X in v).
5 Proof 
To prove the inconsistency of these conditions, we first reduce our task to one of deducing 
from them that a certain function must meet six other conditions proved inconsistent by 
F ishburn (1973: 128, or Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein 1972, or Schwartz 1986:59): 
9 
3A A has three or more members. 
SoPREF P is a function that associates with every v an asymmetric binary 
relation pv on A (a strict "social preference" relation). 
!IA If xPv y and v' is an xy-twin of v then xPv' y (independence of irrelevant
alternatives), 
where v' is an xy-twin of v if and only if, for all i, xv;y � XViY· 
PARETO If XViY for all i then xPvy. 
,B No i is such that, for all v, x, y, if XViY while yvjX for every j # i then 
not yPv x (nonblocker). 
Because these conditions are inconsistent, no function P of profiles can satisfy all of them, 
so this one cannot: 
where 
xPvy if and only if x # y and {x} = C(v') for every xy-twin v' of 
v in which {x, y} is a top set, 
X is a top set in v if and only if every member of X ranks above 
every member of A - X in every v;. 
Hence, it suffices to deduce from our own six conditions that P satisfies the six conditions 
just above. 
From the definition of P it follows immediately that P satisfies SoPREF (the Defi­
nition obviously ensures asymmetry of pv) and IIA (by definition, xP v' y holds for all or
no xy-twins v' of v ). And our F3A is obviously stronger than 3A. Hence, it suffices to 
assume our own six conditions and prove that P satisfies PARETO, ,B, and TRANS. 
To this end we first milk PROB and j3 of all their useful content in a lemma. 
Strategy Lemma. If x E C(v) and v' is an i-variant of v, then (1) x or something 
ranked lower in v; belongs to C ( v'), and ( 2) x or something ranked higher in v; belongs 
to C(v').
Proof of (1). Suppose not. Then the v;-least member y' of C(v') must rank higher 
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in v; than the v;-least member y of C ( v). Let p = p; ( v, C ( v), y) and yH = the highest­
ranked alternative in v;. Then p > 0 by PROB, and u(yH) 2 u(y') > u(y) for every 
representative u of v;. So some such u must make u(yH) - u(y') small enough and 
u(y') -u(y) big enough to ensure this: 
u(y') > pu(y) + (1 
-
p)u(yH).
But ui(C(v')) 2 u(y')
because u(y') :S u(w) for all w E C(v'), and 
u7(C(v)) :S pu(y) + (1 -p)u(yH)
because pu(y) is a summand of ui(C(v)) and u(yH) 2 u(w) for all w. It follows that 
ui(C(v')) > ui(C(v)), contrary to f'-
Proof of (2). Suppose not. Then the v;-first member z of C(v) must rank higher in 
v; than the v;-first member z' of C ( v'). Let p = p; ( v', C ( v), z) and zL = the lowest­
ranked alternative in v;. Then p > 0 by PROB, and u(z) > u(z') 2 u(zL) for every 
representative u of v;. So some such u must make u(z') - u(zL) small enough and 
u( z) -u( z') big enough to ensure this: 
u(z') <pu(z) + ( 1-p)u(zL).
But u7' ( C(v')) :S u( z')
because u(z') 2 u(w) for all w E C(v'), and 
u7'(C(v)) 2 pu(z) + (1- p)u(zL)
because pu(z) is a summand of u7'(C(v)) and u(zL) :S u(w) for all w. It follows that 
u7'(C(v)) > u7'(C(v')), contrary to j3. 
We shall make repeated use of three more lemmata. 
Singleton-Monotonicity Lemma. If C(v) = {x} and every alternative that ranks 
above x in any v; also ranks above x in the corresponding v; , then C(v') = { x }.
Proof. It is enough to show this when v and v' are i-variants for some i; the full lemma 
then follows by n - 1 repetitions. If C(v') contained any y that ranked higher than x 
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in v;, then y or something ranked even higher in v; would have to belong to C(v) by 
Strategy Lemma (2) (with the roles of v and v' reversed). But that is impossible because 
C(v) = {x }. If C(v') contained any y that ranked lower than x in v;, then y would also 
rank lower than x in vi by hypothesis, and y or something ranked even lower in vi would 
have to belong to C(v) = {x} by Strategy Lemma (1), again an impossibility. Hence, no 
alternative but x can belong to C(v'). But</>=/= C(v') � A  by CH. So C(v') = {x}. 
P-Sufficiency Lemma. If x =/= y and C(v) = {x} then xP vy. 
Proof. We must show that C(v') = {x} for every xy-twin v' of v in which {x,y} is a 
top set. But at most y ranks above x in any vi, in which case y also ranks above x in v;. 
So C(v') = {x} by Singleton-Monotonicity Lemma. 
Top Lemma. If X is a top set in v then </> =/= C(v) � X. 
Proof. </> =/= C(v) � A by CH. To show that C(v) � X, take some x E X and 
some vx in which every ordering ranks x first. By CiSov, {x} = C(v') for some v'. 
So {x} = C(vx) by Singleton-Monotonicity Lemma. Now change v to vx one ordering 
at a time. By Strategy Lemma (1), each change from Vi to vf preserves membership 
in the choice set by any given member or something ranked lower in v;. But every 
member of A - X ranks below every member of X in every v;. Hence, if any member of 
A - X belonged to C(v), then some member of A - X would belong to C(vx), which is 
impossible because C(vx) = {x} and x EX. So no member of A - X belongs to C(v), 
and thus C(v) � X. 
With these Jemmata in hand, we can now complete the proof of our theorem by 
deducing that P satisfies PARETO, ,B, and TRANS. 
Proof that P satisfies PARETO. Suppose xv;y for all i (so x =/= y). To prove that 
xf>v y, we must show that C ( v) = { x} whenever v' is an xy-twin of v and { x, y} is a top 
set in v'. But in that case {x} too is a top set in v', so C(v') = {x} by Top Lemma. 
Proof that P satisfies ,B. Suppose on the contrary that i is a b locker in this sense: for 
all x, y, v, if XViY while yv;x whenever j =/= i then not yPv x. We shall deduce, contrary 
to ,D, that for all x, v, if x ranks first in vi then x E C(v). For suppose x <f. C(v). Let y 
rank second in Vi. Take some v' in which v; = Vi while every other vj ranks y first and x 
last. It suffices to .show that C(v') = {y }, which jmplies, by f>,Sufficiency Lemma, that 
ypv' x, contrary to our hypothesis that i is a blocker. 
If the change from v; to vj for any j =/= i let x enter the choice set, then the change 
from vj back to Vj would keep x in by Strategy Lemma (1)  because nothing ranks below 
x in vj. Hence, x <f. C(v'). Now change v' to v" by putting y above x in the ith ordering, 
leaving all else the same. Then if anything that ranked iower than y in vi belonged 
to C(v'), it or something that ranked even lower in v; would have to belong to C(v") 
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by Strategy Lemma (2). But {y} is a top set in v", so C(v") = {y} by Top Lemma. 
Therefore, nothing lower than y in v; can belong to C(v'), so only x and y can belong. 
But x t/. C(v'). Hence, C(v') = {y }. 
Proof that P satisfies TRANS. Suppose xPvypv z. Then x =I y, y =I z, and x =I z by 
SoPREF (asymmetry). To show that xPv z, first change v to vxvz by moving x, y, and 
z above all other alternatives in every ordering while preserving their positions relative 
to each other. Then {x,y,z} is a top set in vxvz, and yxvzjs an xyctwin,.a yz-twin, and 
an xz-twin of v. By IIA, therefore, xPv''' yPv''' z, and it suffices to show that xPxvz z. 
We first show that y t/. C(vxyz). For suppose y E C(vxyz). Change vxyz to vxy one 
ordering at a time by moving z immediately below x and y (below them but above all 
other alternatives) unless it is already there, leaving all else the same. Each change from 
vf"z to vf" must preserve y 's membership in the choice set. That is trivial if vf" = vf"z. 
So suppose not. Then z ranks last among x, y, and z in vf" but not in vf"'. Thus, y 
must rank first in vf" or last among x, y, and z in vf"z. If y ranks first in vf", then y 
stays in the choice set by Strategy Lemma (2). And if y ranks last among x, y, and z 
in vf"z, then y or something even lower in vf"z must belong to the post-change choice 
set by Strategy Lemma (1). But {x,y,z} remains a top set after the change, so nothing 
but x, y, or z can belong to the post-change choice set by Top Lemma, and thus y must 
belong. Hence, y E C(vx"), so C(vx") =I {x}. But that is impossible because xPv"'y, 
{x,y} is a top set in vx", and vxv is an xy-twin of vxyz_ Consequently, y t/. C(vxyz) after 
all. 
By a similar argument (move x below y and z), z tj. C(vxyz). But ¢=I C(vxyz) � 
{x,y,z} by Top Lemma. So C(vxyz) = {x}. It follows by P-Sufliciency Lemma that 
" xyz xPv z, as desired. 
6 Open Questions 
Resolute or not, any multi-alternative collective-choice procedure must be manipulable or 
dictatorial. That is true regardless of the population of individuals or the set of feasible 
alternatives, regardless of how ties are resolved, regardless of the content, accuracy, or 
variety of beliefs about the resolution of ties, and regardless of what counts as an expres­
sion of preferences--r-egardless ·of the ·hypothesized-mapping from preference orderings 
to individual strategies. 
How important is all this? That depends on three open questions, harder than any 
we have answered. 
Question 1. How common is strategic misrepresentation? Manipulability is one 
thing, manipulation another. The one is unavoidable. The other may be rare: a manipu-
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lator must be in a position to change the choice set all by himself, and of course he must 
wish to do so and know enough about the (perhaps yet-to-be) professed preferences of 
others to know that he can. But manipulation is not the only kind of strategic misrep­
resentation. If the opportunity to gain from misrepresentation is rare, the opportunity 
to adopt a dominant strategy of misrepresentation may be greater: a misrepresentation 
by Mr. i that has no effect given the actual combination of acts by others might be 
advantageous under some such combination and disadvantageous under none. Dominant 
strategies of misrepresentation are quite common undeF ·parliamentary procedure with 
fixed agendas (Farquharson 1969, McKelvey and Niemi 1978, Moulin 1979). Here is one 
subject that merits further investigation. More important for us now, if the opportunity 
for individuals to gain by misrepresentation is rare, the opportunity for groups to do so 
may be greater. 
What groups? A small enough group may be scarcely more potent than a single 
individual, and a big enough group may be empowered to get its way without need 
of misrepresentation. Among intermediate groups, an arbitrary one is not likely to be 
organized enough in its actions or cohesive enough in its preferences to strategize. But 
specific groups may be. Let our population be partitioned into groups organized and 
cohesive enough to strategize, given the chance. Call them factions. At least one factional 
partition must exist because individuals (their unit sets, that is) are factions in our sense. 
The rub is that nothing stops us from reinterpreting 1, 2, . . .  , n as factions, however big 
they may be: our theorem applies to any factional partition of the population, coarse or 
fine. 
Roughly speaking, the chance of strategic behavior is greatest when the factional 
partition is coarsest, and an institutional designer bent on minimizing strategic behavior 
should seek to minimize the coarseness of the most likely factional partitions. For small 
and mid-size organizations, that goal might be achieved by the continual shuffling of per­
sonnel among potential factions (or their continual elimination, as Stalin appreciated). 
For democratic polities, factional manipulation might be minimized by anti-careerist 
policies - term limits, weak tenure for civil servants, no collective bargaining. Ancient 
Athens perfected these devices: office holders were chosen by lot and frequently changed. 
For large democratic polities, James Madison argued in his celebrated "Federalist 10"
that factional manipulation of low-rung procedures (constitutions) can be minimized by 
establishing numerous cross-cutting territorial and functional jurisdictions and electoral 
constituencies. How specific arrangements of these sorts affect the chances for manipulat­
ing specific procedures is another subject for further investigation: we suspect there are 
theorems to be proved that would complement the ideas and findings of constitutional 
and organizational theory. 
Que stion 2. Under what conditions can an observer predict an equilib rium, a pro­
fessed profile that no one has an ir1ce11tive to cl1a11ge? Our tl1eore1r1 sl1ows 011ly that 
the "true" profile is not necessarily an equilibrium. Equilibriumhood of any profile is 
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relative to some given profile, itself or another, of supposed true preferences: v' is an 
equilibrium relative to v if and only if ur(C(v")) > ur(C(v')) for no i, i-variant v" of 
v', and representative u of v;. ,S says that every profile is an equilibrium relative to 
itself. But neither ,S nor the equilibriumhood of the true profile is necessary for the 
existence of equilibria, of which there may be many, most of them - possibly all of them 
- predictively useless. Neither is the existence or uniqueness of equilibria, even useful 
ones, necessary for all predictive purposes. We illustrate the range of possibilities with 
six toy examples. 
Example 1. Under Plurality Rule (choose the professed favorites of the most voters), 
the first of these two profiles, the "true" one, yields the choice set { x}, the second { z}: 
1 2 3 
x x x 
y y y 
z z z 
1 2 3 
z z z 
y y y 
x x x 
Although Plurality Rule is manipulable, both profiles are equilibria (relative, as always, 
to the true one). But the second is predictively useless because it is inaccess ib le, foreign 
to any path of manipulations that starts from the true profile. 
Example 2. Under Plurality Rule, the true profile 
1 2 3 4 5 
x x z y y 
y y x x x 
z z y z z 
yields the choice set {x,y}. Mr. 3 can advantageously change this to {x} by raising 
x above z. He alone can manipulate, and no further manipulations are possible. So 
the true profile is not an equilibrium, but the new one is, and of course it is accessible. 
Besides many inaccessible equilibria, there is one more accessible one, also yielding { x}. 
In it, Mr. 3 ranks x above y above z. 
Example 3. Under Plurality Rule, the true profile 
1 2 3 
x y z 
y z x 
z x y 
w w w 
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yields {x,y,z}. Ties are resolved randomly, and everyone knows it. With preference in­
tensities represented by vertical distance in our picture, Mr. 1 can advantageously change 
{ x, y, z} to {y} by raising y above x. Mr. 2 or Mr. 3 could have manipulated in a similar 
way, creating an equilibrium that yielded { z} or { x}. So different paths end in different 
equilibria and different choices. There is a coordination problem: Messrs. 1,2, and 3 
might try to manipulate simultaneously, creating a nonequilibrium profile that yielded 
the original { x, y, z}. Despite the multiplicity of accessible equilibria yielding different 
choice sets and despite the coordination problem, we can still predict the rejection of w:
it is not chosen along any path. 
Example 4 .  The true profile is 
1 2 
x z 
y x 
z y 
w w 
The operative procedure says the choice set is { w} unless one or both individuals rank w
last, in which case the choice set is {x} if both rank x above y, {y} if both rank y above 
x, and {z} otherwise. So the true profile yields {x}. But Mr. 2 can advantageously 
change this to {z} by raising y above x, after which Mr. 1 can advantageously change 
{z} to {y} by raising y above x, after which Mr. 2 can advantageously change {y} to 
{ z} by raising x above y, and so on. Although no profile is an equilibrium, we can still 
predict the rejection of w: as before, w is not chosen along any path. 
Example 5. This is like Example 4 except that the choice set is { w} unless both
individuals rank w last. Now, all profiles in which neither individual ranks w last are 
equilibria, and they are the only ones. But all of them are inaccessible. 
In Examples 1-3 and 5, the inaccessible equilibria can be eliminated by successively 
eliminating dominated professions of preference. But that is not always true, as witness: 
Example 6. Of these two profiles, the first is the true one: 
1 2 1 2 
x x y y 
y y x x 
z z z z 
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Under the operative procedure, the first profile yields { x}, the second {y}, all others { z}. 
So both displayed profiles are equilibria. The second is inaccessible, but the orderings 
therein are undominated. 
A manipulator "changes" the choice set from X to Y by "changing" his professed 
ordering from his true one to a new one. His manipulation is contractiv e if Y C X,
disruptive if not. It might be thought that all paths would end in equilibria if all possible 
manipulations were contractive, if our procedure satisfied 
Wf:. If v and v' are i-variants and ul'(C(v')) > ui(C(v)) for some rep­
resentative u of v;, then C(v') C C(v) (weak strategy freedom). 
Any series of changes that merely contract the choice set must end, after all, because A 
is finite. 
But it does not immediately follow from W ;S that all strategic paths must end. 
Imagine a path from v1 to v2 to v3 that changes the choice set from {x,y,z} to {x,y} 
to {x}. Suppose Mr. i can unilaterally change the choice set from {x} back to {x,y} by 
changing v3 to v4. Assuming W p, { x, y} cannot be better than { x} according to vf:
u7' ( { x, y}) > u7' ( { x}) for no representative u of vf. However, if vf f. vf then it is not
Mr. i's currently professed v( but his true vf that motivates his behavior, and for all we 
know, {x,y} is better than {x} according to v[ : maybeu7'({x,y}) > u7'({x}) for some 
representative u of vf . For all we know, indeed, a path of strategic contractions could 
create the strategic opportunity, not originally present in v1, to choose an alternative 
outside { x, y, z}. Maybe W ,S does ban this sort of thing, but that is not obvious: a 
proof is needed. 
To formalize all this, denote any sequence of profiles by s, and any ordered n-tuple 
of utility functions by u = ( u1, . • .  , un) · Those functions are representatives of the corre­
sponding orderings in one profile. Call it vu. Define: 
and 
Then 
and 
v' u-succeeds v if and only if, for some i, v' is an i-variant of v and 
u7"(C(v')) > u7"(C(v)), 
s is a u-path if and only if v" is the first profile in s and every 
successive profile in s u-succeeds its immediate predecessor. 
v is au-equi lib rium if and only if no profile u-succeeds v, 
v is u-accessib le if and only if v belongs to some u-path.
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As we know, there may be a u-accessible u-equilibrium different from vu, and there 
may be more than one: each is then path-dependent. Also a u-path may end with a u­
equilibrium or cycle endlessly (u-paths of both sorts sometimes coexist, we have found). 
The obvious open questions demand conditions governing the existence, nonexistence, 
uniqueness, and path-dependence of u-accessible u-equilibria for any given u, and the 
effects of W p on such matters. An open question of a different sort is whether anything 
like our theorem remains true when p is weakened to W p. 
Regardless of the answers, our imagined observer might predict, given u, that the 
chosen alternative will belong to 
PRED(u) = {x I for some u-path sand v ins, x E C(v) and 
either vis a u-equilibrium or v recurs infinitely often ins }. 
A more elaborate treatment would allow p; to depend on finite sequences of profiles 
rather than single profiles. Also it would allow simultaneous strategic moves, with and 
without coordinating signals. And it would pare down the range of profiles by (per­
haps among other ways) successively eliminating dominated professions of preference. A 
greater elaboration would impute greater sophistication to individuals by letting them 
see the branches of extensive-form games instead of seeking the momentary advantages of 
short steps down foggy paths. Coordination problems would then show up as information 
sets, and endless cycles would give way to mixed-strategy equilibria. 
Question 3. When can an institutional designer achieve his goals? Never, if one of 
his goals is to make manipulation impossible. Maybe quite often, if he seeks merely to 
make manipulation unlikely. Why would he care about manipulation? 
He might deplore manipulation because he deplores the "dishonesty" of manipulators 
or the information costs they bear or the "unfair" advantages they gain. He would 
specifically deplore contractiv e manipulation if he sought to keep choice sets as big as 
possible once certain constraints were met. Maybe the intended tie-resolving process 
is completely decentralized, driven by voluntary individual behavior , and our designer 
seeks to maximize liberty by making pre-resolution choices as permissive as can be. 
Or perhaps he is designing a constitution for a sovereign state, understands that it 
must be self-enforcing for want of any higher authority, and appreciates that a self­
enforcing constitution cannot be too specific or constraining in its policy requirements 
lest opponents of particular policies pursue their ends outside rather than inside the 
constitution. However, if his sole goal is "good" choices, and if C(v) always comprises 
"good" alternatives when v is the true profile, then contractive manipulation by itself is 
not objectionable to him. 
This suggests that our designer would be happy to settle for W p, which bans only 
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disruptive manipulations. But for all we know, W ,B is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for "good" choices. Strategic contractions may be unobjectionable by themselves. As 
noted earlier, however, a path of strategic contractions might conceivably create the op­
portunity, not originally present, for departures from the unmanipulated choice set. Also 
a path of manipulations, some disruptive, might conceivably lead outside the unmanip­
ulated choice set but then terminate inside that set or settle down in an infinite cycle 
within that set. 
If C(v) always comprises "good" alternatives when v is the true profile, and if our 
PRED function makes satisfactory predictions, then "good" choices are ensured by 
But even this is stronger than necessary. For we have unnecessarily assumed that C 
represents both the operative procedure and the criterion for "good" choices absent 
manipulation. Let C continue to represent the former, but now let G represent the latter. 
While we are at it, we may as well let G depend on utility functions (though G may be 
invariant under monotonic changes in those functions). So G(u) is the set of "good" 
alternatives when u1 • • •  Un are the true utility functions of Messrs. 1, 2, . . .  , n. To ensure 
"good" choices, it is not necessary that C(vu) � G(u) or P RED(u) � C(vu). Again 
assuming the adequacy of PRED, this is necessary and sufficient for "good" collective 
choices: 
PRED(u) � G(u). 
The problem is to find plausible conditions on C and G which imply p*, or failing that, 
to find plausible conditions inconsistent with /3*. 
The former problem is akin to that of finding plausible conditions for Nash-imple­
mentability of G (Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin 1979, Maskin 1985). One difference 
is that ;S* does not require the existence of Nash equilibria. Implementation theory 
does contemplate different solution concepts, but all are refinements of Nash. We instead 
let strategic maneuvers cycle endlessly, so long as they never lead outside the G-set, or 
anyway so long as the cycle eventually settles down for good inside that set. If our goal is 
to ensure that collective.choices.belong to some target set, .the.demand for Nash equilibria 
is unwarranted. 
Another difference is that we equate individual strategies with preference orderings. 
Implementation theory is more abstract: strategies can be objects of any sort. Our 
equation is more than the legacy of the strategy-freedom literature: it lets us define 
accessibility in terms of strategic paths from true profiles. Accessibility is more important, 
we think, than equilibriumhood, both because equilibria tend to abound when they exist 
19 
at all and because our substantive problem (to ensure "good" choices) does not require 
their existence. If, however, we wish to let strategies be objects of any sort, we can then 
define accessibility by naming one "naive" strategy N,U for every i and u and requiring 
( N;', ... , N';) to be the first step of every u-path. 
The biggest difference from our point of view is that we do not require resoluteness: a 
profile (or vector of strategies) produces a set of alternatives. In a sense, games must yield 
single outcomes. But in that sense, those outcomes are vectors.of strategies. They can 
be mapped into further consequences of any sort in any number of ways, depending on 
intended applications. Implementation theory applies game theory to social-choice the­
ory by starting with a mapping of outcomes into collective choices. But it assumes that 
collective choices are single chosen alternatives rather than choice sets. That assump­
tion is pointless on its face, unrealistic because real collective-choice procedures rarely 
are resolute, and unwarranted by the stated substantive problem because multi-member 
choice sets are compatible with the goal of achieving "good" choices. 
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